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Although many genocide scholars adopt sociological or other social scientiﬁc deﬁnitions
of genocide, other leading genocide scholars have propounded a purportedly legal deﬁ-
nition that is unduly narrow. Presumably based on the drafting history of the United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNCG), this narrow deﬁnition actually rests upon incomplete and selective references
to legal sources with misleading implications. This is apparent during discussions of
the question of whether partial genocides, such as by “ethnic cleansing,” constitute the
crime of genocide.
In this article, I argue that the greatest setback to genocide scholarship, and one
largely self-inﬂicted by some genocide scholars, is the elevation of the requirement of
genocidal intent to a standard that is nearly impossible to satisfy because it requires the
total destruction of a race. This view has gained ground within the UN system in recent
years, as represented by certain ﬁndings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), and the trial chamber of the
UN-backed International Criminal Court (ICC). At the root of this misunderstanding
is some scholars’ equation of the intent to destroy a group—as required by Article II of
the UNCG—with a state’s deliberate plan or policy to exterminate the members of an
entire racial group, or a total genocide. Contrary to this distortion of the UNCG, its
drafters and ratiﬁers rejected efforts to limit genocide to total destruction, a plan or pol-
icy of destruction, or a motive of racial hatred. This explains why the UNCG deﬁnes
genocidal intent so as to include the “intent to destroy . . . in part” and why the UN and
its members consistently condemn ethnic cleansing as genocide.1
Achievements of Genocide Studies
Scholars, human rights groups, and journalists have made steady progress over the past
seven decades in identifying genocide and other crimes against civilian populations and
in persuading prosecutors and UN ofﬁcials to initiate proceedings. Raphael Lemkin
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pioneered this process, which was taken up most effectively by John Barron and René
Lemarchand in the 1970s,2 by Leo Kuper and Israel Charny in the 1980s,3 and by Rich-
ard Hovannisian, Vahakn Dadrian, and Robert Melson with regard to the Armenian
genocide in the 1980s and 1990s,4 with the latter tradition being expanded upon by
Thea Halo, Donald Bloxham, and Adam Jones in the 2000s as they documented a gen-
eral Ottoman Christian genocide.5 Since the 1990s, Frank Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, Helen
Fein, R.J. Rummel, Iris Chang, Samantha Power, Ben Kiernan, and Samuel Totten have
described other genocides, especially in Africa and Asia.6
Even without a standing international criminal court, scholars and other writers
have consistently shined the light of truth upon attempts to shroud genocide within the
fog of war. Although the convictions of high-ranking Nazis for the Holocaust at the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, were for “extermination of the Jews” rather
than “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin fought as adviser to the tribunal to have destructive
acts against Jews, Poles, “Gypsies,” and others indicted as genocide, and the concept
was used in the indictment.7 The British prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial argued that
not only Jews but also Belgians, Dutch, French, Norwegians, and Yugoslavs had been
victims of genocide.8 This echoed Lemkin, who wrote that Poles, Slovenes, and Russians
were victims of genocide by mass killings under German “colonization.”9 Lemkin ar-
gued in 1953 that the Soviet Union and its allies were guilty of genocide by killings and
deportations to Siberia.10
After Lemkin’s death in 1959, legal scholars and politicians continued to uncover
evidence of genocide in the Soviet Union, China, Nigeria, Pakistan, Vietnam, Cambo-
dia, Iraq, Sudan, and elsewhere.11 Scholars helped persuade the UN to establish interna-
tional criminal tribunals backed by the Security Council for Rwanda and Yugoslavia
and to support the drafting of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998, and other scholars
helped persuade the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over genocide.12
Was the UNCG Only Intended to Apply to Total Genocides?
In recent years, scholars and genocide prosecutors have had to contend with an exces-
sively pro-perpetrator interpretation of the UNCG. This interpretation would attempt
to remove all doubt that a genocide conviction is appropriate by requiring an extraordi-
narily high showing of the intent to destroy an entire group and its physical and biolog-
ical remnants accompanied by racist motives completely unrelated to any political
purpose. Taken seriously, this interpretation is virtually impossible to satisfy with evi-
dence. Thus, it may undo much of the progress made since 1945 in deﬁning genocide
and banning it.
Typically, a treaty like the UNCG is interpreted to give effect to its text, its drafting
history, and the case law applying it.13 Unfortunately, in the past decade and a half, a
form of scholarship has emerged that very selectively takes account of these sources,
especially the working papers or travaux préparatoires, and ends up constructing a
strained and anti-victim meaning of key phrases in the treaty.
One way not to interpret a treaty is to make its provisions so difﬁcult to satisfy that
no concrete case qualiﬁes, making the treaty useless and frustrating its drafters’ pur-
poses. Some scholars conﬁne the deﬁnition of genocide to a set of very rare and unique
events that may never be repeated as long as politicians have enough sense to not write
down that they are exterminating races for no good reason. In that sense, the interpreta-
tion is very favorable to the perpetrators of genocide who appear as defendants before
international criminal tribunals.14 It is, therefore, also anti-victim in effect. For example,
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one scholar argues that a “lone genocidal maniac” should receive psychiatric care rather
than criminal punishment, whereas a victim might well disagree.15
Some scholars and practitioners in the ﬁeld of genocide law argue that only total
biological and physical genocide, and not partial physical genocide or systematic eco-
nomic or cultural genocide, are covered by the UNCG.16 For example, Professor Wil-
liam Schabas (University of Ireland at Galway) suggests that the Holocaust and the
Rwandan Genocide represented true, legal genocides,17 while the Armenian Genocide,
Bangladesh, Biafra, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Darfur did not.18
He argues that genocide requires a motive to destroy the entire group for reasons of
“racist hatred,” and that the presence of mixed racial and political/military motives
precludes genocidal intent—that is, the speciﬁc intent to destroy the group.19 Other
scholars also equate motive with intent.20
Professor Steven Katz (Boston University, formerly Co-Chair of the Academic Com-
mittee of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum), adopts a similarly narrow interpretation
of the crime of genocide. As a result, Katz opines that there was no genocidal intent in
Rwanda.21 He argues that the Hutu-Tutsi conﬂict in Rwanda was “not genocidal” but
rather a war for “tribal domination.”22 Katz also argues that even if the Ottoman Empire
killed 775,000 Armenians, this would not be genocide because 17–27% of Armenians sur-
vived and this did not amount to the “complete physical extirpation of every person of
Armenian heritage.”23 These equations of genocide with total extermination for no rea-
son, rather than ethnic conﬂict resulting in mass violence, is analogous to the argument
that the Srebrenica massacres did not indicate genocidal intent because they were not
total; that is, the women and children of the region lived and the Bosnian Serbs might
have had good tactical reasons to massacre Muslim men and boys.24
Both Katz and Professor Emeritus Guenter Lewy of the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst have argued that only Jews were victims of genocide and all Jews were vic-
tims of a total genocide in the Holocaust or Hebrew Shoah.25 Lewy explains that the dif-
ference is that the Nazis intended to “annihilate physically every man, woman and
child” who was Jewish.26 Katz similarly identiﬁes the distinction between Jewish geno-
cide and other tragedies on the basis that there was an “intention to kill all Jews without
escape.”27 Lewy argues that killing 40% of the world’s Armenians was not genocide,
without noting the rate of Jews surviving the Nazis.28 He contends that, unlike the
Holocaust, the Armenian case lacks evidence of a “state-sponsored plan of annihila-
tion.”29 Likewise, Katz ﬁnds no genocide in Armenia because “several hundred thou-
sand Armenians survived” their deportations.30 He does not calculate how many Jewish
survivors there may have been after 1945.31
These total genocide theories differ in some respects. Unlike Katz and Lewy, for
example, Schabas does not ignore the fact that the case of the Armenians was among
those considered by the drafters of the UNCG as a typical or exemplary case of geno-
cide.32 Moreover, Schabas does not deny that Rwanda was a genocide; in fact, he was
among the ﬁrst to allege that Tutsi may be victims of genocide in Rwanda.33 Finally,
Schabas acknowledges the existence of case law and other legal materials that have
found genocide to have been committed where there were survivors.34 He simply at-
tempts, as set forth below, to prove that case law wrong.
The total genocide interpretation of the UNCG is ﬂawed whether the text of the
UNCG, the UN drafting history, or the case law is considered. The UNCG deﬁnes as
genocide certain acts with “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
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ethnical, racial or religious group.”35 Not one of the acts is restricted to exterminating
the group and killing all of its members. In fact, both Lemkin and the UNCG repeatedly
emphasize that the victims may survive36; thus, they deﬁned genocide to include
destructive acts other than killing, such as harming physical and mental health, degrad-
ing economic conditions, and interfering with the birth and rearing of children.37
The introduction of the words “in part” into Article II of UNCG was achieved by
the Norwegian delegation to the drafting committee.38 The Norwegian delegation ar-
gued that “it was not necessary to kill all the members of a group in order to commit
genocide.”39 The Yugoslav delegation agreed, pointing out that “the main characteristic
of genocide lay in the intent to attack a group,” in other words not simply the intent to
exterminate a group.40 The Uruguayan delegation proclaimed that partial genocide
was already covered by the “intent to destroy a group,” because “genocide was commit-
ted when a member of a group was attacked.”41 The US delegation concurred, explain-
ing that genocide is not so much about the extermination of groups as the “denial of
the[ir] right to live” and insisting that the UNCG must “afford protection to human
groups against the acts of individuals.”42 The British delegation noted that “if it was de-
sired to ensure that cases of partial destruction should also be punished, the amendment
proposed by the Norwegian delegation would” do that.43 The French delegation voted
for the Norwegian proposal because it clariﬁed that genocidal intent would include
an intent to kill or inﬂict mental harm on “an individual as a member of a human
group.”44
Was the UNCG Intended to Apply Only to Racial Genocides?
Some scholars contend that speciﬁc intent means the intent to destroy the group com-
pletely, as part of a plan or policy of total destruction, and not to destroy some of it
physically and eliminate the remainder of the group by refugee ﬂight.45 They suggest
that the use of the phrase dolus specialis in the drafting committee’s report requires a
motive of racial hatred on the part of génocidaires.46 Special intent or dolus specialis is
contrasted with dolus eventualis or the conscious disregard of a known risk (reckless-
ness as to the result).47 The idea is that a series of massacres alone may not be “calcu-
lated to destroy the group, in the sense of genuine [Nazi-style] extermination camps.”48
Scholars use terms such as “racial hatred” and “physical extermination” to describe the
intent to destroy thus construed.49 One even says that to charge a suspect with geno-
cide, prosecutors need to ﬁnd a “centralized blueprint for racial annihilation.”50
The report of the committee on the drafting of the UNCG reveals that genocidal
intent was distinguished from the Nazis’ premeditated racist extermination campaign
against the Jews, so that genocidal intent may exist in more varied circumstances.
Among other evidence, a Soviet amendment speciﬁcally emphasizing racism and Hitler-
ism was rejected, and another Soviet amendment underlining the importance of “racial
hatred” also failed.51 Moreover, language deﬁning genocide as requiring an intent to act
“on grounds of national or racial origin” was replaced with a deﬁnition including the
“intent to destroy [a group] in whole or in part,” and language suggesting that perpetra-
tors must be motivated to act “particularly on grounds of ” race, nation, or religion was
refused.52
The point is, delegates declined to link genocide explicitly to racism or Hitlerism
because other forms of intent may sufﬁce for the crime of genocide.53 The Soviet Union
unsuccessfully pressed the view that genocide requires extermination of entire groups
“because of their race and nationality.”54 Most importantly, the other delegates turned
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back a proposed Soviet amendment which would have required acts “particularly on
grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief ” because most delegates believed
that “the destruction of a human group on any grounds should be forbidden.”55 There-
fore, a requirement of discriminatory motives was not adopted.
The effect of adopting a highly restrictive construction of the UNCG is the same as
if every Soviet amendment had been accepted. But this frustrates the intent of the other
delegates, who intended the UNCG to apply to other motives and contexts.
Does the UNCG Require Physical or Biological Destruction?
The total genocide interpretation of the UNCG equates intent to destroy with physical
destruction.56 Some scholars have argued that genocide was not committed in Darfur
because the state did not achieve “the intentional physical destruction of an ethnic
group.”57 Some have also argued that the Cambodian Genocide did not occur because
Cambodians are not a protected national group, and religious minorities were singled
out for assimilation rather than murder.58 According to this interpretation, the UN
General Assembly, Cambodian war crimes tribunal, and US Congress were simply
being “idiosyncratic” or “political” in declaring a Cambodian genocide.59 A similar
argument is made about Kosovo, often while refusing to note that in 1999 several lea-
ders of the key states involved in the drafting of the UNCG condemned genocide in
Kosovo.60
Furthermore, some scholars condemned the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for ruling that genocide was committed at Srebrenica as
a result of the massacre of up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys. Schabas, for
example, argues because genocide must be physical, it “distort[s]” the UNCG to ﬁnd, as
the tribunal has, that genocide could be committed by massacring the men and boys of
a community in order to make its physical survival in the area difﬁcult or impossible.61
Another scholar remarks that because the Srebrenica massacre was improvised by the
military, it lacked the element of political strategy to exterminate a race required to
apply the stigma of genocide.62
There is extensive evidence in the text of the treaty and in the travaux prépara-
toires, however, that the drafters intended to prohibit non-physical genocides as well.
The text of the UNCG refers to “mental harm” and to the forced removal of children
from their parents’ inﬂuence not as crimes against humanity but as acts of genocide.
The word “physical” is used to qualify only one of the listed acts—the imposition of liv-
ing conditions calculated to bring about the group’s destruction.63 The intent to destroy,
therefore, need not be physical when the act does not kill.64
The drafting history of the UNCG reveals that the Soviet Union proposed another
amendment limiting the intent to destroy a group to acts “aimed at the physical
destruction” of the group, which was rejected.65 The Soviet Union argued that because
“article II was concerned with biological genocide,” the “idea of ‘physical destruction’
should therefore be speciﬁed in the text of the deﬁnition” so as to distinguish it from
cultural genocide.66 The other delegates spoke out against this proposal. One delegate
remarked that “history gave examples of genocide where there had been no intent of
physical destruction of the groups concerned,” which would not constitute genocide
under the Soviet amendment, such as when “the older members of a group had been
killed and the younger ones converted by diverse means to an ideology different from
their own.”67 The United States agreed, explaining that the intent to destroy need not
be shown by the actual destruction of the group as a result of the perpetrators’ acts.68
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The Soviet amendment was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 36 to 11, with four
abstentions.69
The Soviet Union also proposed that genocide requires a “physical destruction of [a]
racial, national (or religious) group committed on racial, national (or religious) grounds”
and not merely an intent to destroy a group in whole or in part.70 This amendment failed
as well.71 Therefore, as one delegate opposing the Soviet proposals explained, genocide
may occur under Article II even though “individual members of [the group] continued
to live normally without having suffered physical harm.”72 The mental genocide prong
of Article II conﬁrms this interpretation.73 It applies to all “inhumane . . . treatment” and
“persecution” that targets a group and tends toward its mental destruction.74
When the Soviet Union attempted to make religious genocide a subset of national
genocide, a coalition of states including Egypt, Greece, and Yugoslavia successfully orga-
nized the opposition to this amendment. They pointed to ethnic and religious cleansing
between Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan, Jews and Muslims in Palestine, and
Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia and argued that such “genocides” should be prohibited.75
In none of these historical episodes was the group completely eradicated, so the “geno-
cide” was partial, potentially covered by the “destroy . . . in part” language adopted by
the drafters.
Some scholars argue that ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide were excluded
from the UNCG when Article III of the original draft was stripped during the delibera-
tions and when a Syrian amendment addressing forced displacement was rejected.76 A
closer examination reveals, however, that these proposals were not rejected because the
drafters wanted to immunize from prosecution as genocide the selective murder of the
leaders or adult men of a group followed by the deportation or forcible assimilation of
women or children. Quite the contrary is true. The problem with Article III was not
that it prohibited cultural genocide but that it deﬁned it so broadly as to include restric-
tions on the use of language (think of English-only education laws), the destruction or
“dispersion” of documents or objects of cultural or historical value (think of urban
development projects), and the “systematic destruction of books” (think of libraries
weeding out collections).77 It was therefore too difﬁcult to establish the limits of cultural
genocide when it was deﬁned to include the “use of the language of the group . . . in
schools” or “preventing the use of . . . museums, schools, historical monuments, or
places of worship.”78 Schabas remarks that the US and Canada led the opposition to
“cultural genocide”; they actually opposed including “ethnical” (or cultural and linguis-
tic) groups in the UNCG at all, but they lost this ﬁght when ethnic groups were in-
cluded alongside racial groups.79
Similarly, the Syrian proposal was extremely overbroad in including any “measures
intended to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes” by intimidating them,
which might apply to the construction of public works such as highways through for-
merly residential neighborhoods after use of the power of eminent domain to force
residents to leave.80 All of the leaders of the countries joining the treaty could be prose-
cuted for becoming complicit in genocide by building highways. The government of
India objected that “not even the threat of genocide” was required by the Syrian amend-
ment.81 The Soviet Union argued that true compulsion to depart from one’s home
under a threat of genocide was already covered by the draft convention.82
The intent of the drafters not to immunize ethnic cleansing as practiced in the
Ottoman Empire, or more recently in the former Yugoslavia, was absolutely clear. The
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drafters announced their design to prevent and punish ethnic cleansing when they ac-
cepted a Swedish amendment to add “ethnical”83 to the Soviet categories of national,
racial, or religious genocide. They made this amendment expressly in order to clarify
that the impact upon the “whole of the traditions of a group, with its cultural and his-
torical heritage, had to be taken into account.”84 Sweden emphasized that in some cases
a group’s language rather than its race would be the target of attacks.85 Sweden also ar-
gued that the law of genocide should protect “a group which was held together by a
common origin or common identity.”86 It was understood that the Swedish amendment
would apply to instances such as the post-World War II ethnic cleansing of the Ger-
mans in Poland and the Poles in Germany.87 Sweden argued that such groups “might
be deﬁned by the whole of [their] traditions and [their] cultural heritage.”88 The US and
the Soviet Union also agreed that the UNCG should apply to the members of political
groups who make up the intellectual or cultural leaders of populations that an occupy-
ing army like that of the Nazis was attempting to “subjugate.”89 A Greek amendment
designed to prevent genocide by the forced abduction of children to be raised in new fa-
milies, as occurred in the Ottoman Empire, also passed.90
The drafters made other departures from the model of physical genocide as in the
case of the Jews gassed at Auschwitz. They dismissed a proposal to limit mental harm
to “mutilations and biological experiments.”91 The US argued that physical injury not
resulting in permanent harm or mutilations should be protected against.92 The drafters
similarly expanded a predicate act of genocide from the impairment of the “physical
integrity” of group members to the inﬂiction of serious bodily or mental harm upon
them.93 China explained that outlawing genocide was of cardinal importance to China
because the Japanese had committed genocide in China by various methods, such as by
dealing opium.94 Japan has yet to ratify the UNCG.95
The text and drafting history clarify that genocide may occur by “deliberately in-
ﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part”96 with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, even
when total destruction does not result. This prong of Article II actually summarizes a
longer list of acts identiﬁed by the UN Secretary-General as causing slow death or
impairment to a group’s health, such as denial of food, medical care, hygiene, clothing,
or housing and compulsion to perform excessive physical work.97 The Secretary-
General suggested that what is now called ethnic cleansing might inﬂict conditions of
life calculated to destroy the group in part when it results in the denial of group mem-
bers’ livelihoods, conﬁscation of their homes and means of sheltering their children,
mass dismissals from employment, and the refusal of food or other supplies needed for
families to survive.98 Schabas also concedes that the drafters of the UNCG considered
the Armenian Genocide, in which mass deportations resulted in deaths from hunger
and exposure and were accompanied by direct massacres, as the paradigm of indirect
genocide using the forces of nature.99 But he argues that the UNCG is not applicable to
the Armenian Genocide because Armenians suffered only cultural harm in the period
since genocide entered customary international law sometime after 1914.100
In light of this drafting history, the German Supreme Court has found that geno-
cide was committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina because “cleansing” occurred by “kill-
ings, . . . a determined effort to capture others for killing, the forced transportation or
exile of the remaining population, and the destruction of homes and places of wor-
ship.”101 The fact that some victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were deported or exiled
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did not preclude a conviction for genocide. Similarly, the US Supreme Court let stand a
federal appeals court’s ruling which concluded that genocide occurred in Bosnia even
prior to Srebrenica.102 Courts in Austria, Brazil, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Ethio-
pia, Latvia, Lithuania, Iraq, Spain, and Ukraine have also conﬁrmed that the UNCG was
not intended to be applied narrowly so as to be triggered only when a plan or policy to
destroy an entire group is decided upon at the heights of state power. They have found
defendants culpable for genocide based on localized massacres and forcible displace-
ment of the remaining population.103 National courts have ruled that massacres affect-
ing as few as 12 members of a group could reﬂect genocidal intent.104 Based on this
reading, leaders of states party to the UNCG have laid genocide charges at the diplo-
matic or political level after massacres in which most of the group survived, as in Biafra
in 1968, Bangladesh in 1971, Cyprus in 1974, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Iraq in 1984
and 1987–1991, Bosnia in the early 1990s, and Kosovo in the late 1990s.105 Such charges
amount to state practice of genocide.
Other sources of the customary international law of genocide are to similar effect.
These sources include General Assembly resolutions, the practice of domestic parlia-
ments, the proclamations of national politicians and diplomats, the reports of UN ex-
perts, and the treatises of jurists and international law scholars.106 The international
community has simply refused to restrict the crime of genocide to total unprovoked
genocides based on state policy. A number of General Assembly resolutions recognize
ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide.107 Many, perhaps most, of the delegates to
the drafting process of the UNCG described ethnic cleansing (including the ethnic
cleansing conducted by the Soviet Union) as genocide.108 The Pakistani delegate called
cultural genocide indivisible from physical genocide under Article II.109 The representa-
tives of several other states agreed that when accompanied by violence, cultural geno-
cide should be prohibited by the UNCG.110 Numerous treatise writers make similar
arguments.111 Turkey and other countries that have ratiﬁed the UNCG have protected
cultural and political groups from genocide and have often condemned ethnic cleansing
as genocide.112
Schabas has argued that the ICC, the ICJ, and the ICID are in agreement with him
that ethnic cleansing is irreconcilable with an intent to destroy a group in whole or in
part.113 It is unfortunately true that the ICJ, following Schabas’s lead, concluded in 2007
that the drafting history of the UNCG excludes destruction of the group through dis-
placement alone and includes only “biological” and “physical” destruction.114 However,
the ICJ indicated that ethnic cleansing may constitute genocide when it rises to the level
of “deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part” without persuasively analyzing whether this
was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina.115 The Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC initially
agreed with the ICJ, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the ICC’s appellate
body.116 The Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected a charge of genocide after concluding that
the government of Sudan may have “subjected, throughout the Darfur region, thou-
sands of civilians, belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, to acts
of murder and extermination.”117 The ICID report adopted a similarly pro-defendant
construction of the UNCG when it determined that even though the UNCG was origi-
nally intended to protect groups against the destruction of a substantial number of their
members, the destruction of a substantial number of Fur and Masalit people did not
qualify as genocide.118
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The international criminal tribunals have often agreed with the Appeals Chamber
of the ICC that deportation could constitute genocide and disagreed with its Pre-Trial
Chamber I and the ICID report on that point. The ICTY has twice ruled that survivors
of selective killings might suffer mental genocide because they fear that they might be
killed or injured.119 The ICTY’s decision on the indictment against Radovan Karadzić
and Ratko Mladić stated “that cruel treatment, torture, rape and deportation could con-
stitute serious bodily or mental harm done to members of a group under a count of
genocide.”120 The ICTY has found “that the forcible transfer of individuals could lead
to the material destruction of the group, since the group ceases to exist as a group, or at
least as the group it was.”121 It has also conﬁrmed three times “that the means of delib-
erately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction, in whole or in part, include subjecting a group of people to a subsistence
diet, systematic expulsion from their homes and deprivation of essential medical sup-
plies below a minimum vital standard.”122 Although some defendants accused of geno-
cide by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina were acquitted, these perpetrators
spared from harm most of the civilians under their area of effective control and did not
even deport most of them.123
The judgment in the trial of the mastermind of the Rwandan Genocide, Théoneste
Bagosora, also indicates that the impossible standard of proof advocated by the ICJ was
not applied. Although rejecting the prosecution’s theory of a military-led conspiracy to
commit genocide in Rwanda against all Tutsi, even those who were not suspected of
sympathizing with the rebellion, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) in 2008 convicted several military defendants of genocide for carrying out selec-
tive massacres of Tutsi in Kigali as well as in other places, including a church, a mosque,
and a university.124 Other ICTR convictions largely inferred genocidal intent without re-
quiring smoking-gun evidence of a state policy of genocide; the judges look for evidence
of large-scale atrocities, systematic ethnic targeting, the use of derogatory ethnic lan-
guage or slurs, and the large scale of the attempted destruction of those who survived.125
Does the UNCG Only Prohibit a Plan or Policy of Genocide?
In 2005, the ICID concluded that the government of Sudan had not pursued a policy of
genocide despite many massacres, mass rapes, deportations, burnings of villages,
destruction of foodstuffs, and so forth.126 The report, according to some scholars, de-
monstrated that a “state plan or policy” is an “essential element” of the crime of geno-
cide even if it was “unspoken” by the UNCG’s drafters.127 In 2007, for example, Schabas
defended the “theoretical construction” of genocide adopted by the ICJ, under which
ethnic cleansing does not constitute genocide because it does not reﬂect a plan or policy
of total destruction.128
The text of the UNCG clearly does not require a plan or policy of genocide by the
state or its rulers.129 Instead, Article IV of the UNCG makes it clear that private indivi-
duals who are not public ofﬁcials may commit genocide.130
During the drafting process, the US and other nations blocked a proposed require-
ment for government ofﬁcials to “co-operate” in genocide because these nations intended
the UNCG to “afford protection to human groups against the acts of individuals.”131
Likewise, a proposed requirement of “deliberate” acts prompted opposition because
“premeditation had a special meaning, distinct from that of intention.”132 The “intent to
destroy” requirement represented a liberalization of the Secretary-General’s draft, which
required a “purpose of destroying.”133 The Secretary-General apparently designed the
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purposeful genocide requirement to ensure that the “act must be deliberate,” as opposed
to “isolated acts of violence not aimed at the destruction of a group of human beings.”134
Therefore, the phrase “deliberate acts” became “acts” in the deﬁnition of genocidal intent,
and the proposed requirement that ofﬁcials “co-operate” in the killing was dropped.135
The delegates’ rejection of a requirement of racist motive or premeditation is
important because in common law the notion of intent or speciﬁc intent may be
inferred from conduct. Courts infer speciﬁc intent to kill in domestic US law from the
destructive nature of an act, such as shooting another person.136 The international
criminal tribunals, with many judges trained in the civil law tradition, have similarly
inferred intent from the act and the surrounding circumstances.137 Otherwise, only a
confession could convict.138
In response to a French amendment that would require the participation or “con-
nivance” of constitutional rulers in genocide, the drafters expressed widespread opposi-
tion to such a deﬁnition. Like scholars endorsing a “plan or policy” element for the
crime of genocide, France wanted to “deﬁne genocide in terms of its essential and pri-
mary character as a governmental crime.”139 The US delegate, on the other hand, de-
clared that the killing of even one individual with the intent to destroy a group could be
genocide.140 The US desired to preserve state responsibility for genocide in instances
“where an act of genocide had been committed by private individuals without any par-
ticipation by the rulers, if those rulers had not taken appropriate measures to punish
the guilty persons.”141 The UK delegate explained that “acts of genocide committed, en-
couraged or tolerated by rulers were not the only cases of genocide.”142 The delegates of
Iran and Pakistan likewise objected because under the amendment the massacres of reli-
gious groups recently committed in India would not be covered and insisted that such
“fascist or terrorist organizations” should be punished regardless of the degree of partic-
ipation of the state.143 The Egyptian delegate made similar comments about recent
massacres in Palestine.144 Brazil’s delegate explained that “cultural genocide” could
“obviously be committed by private individuals without any responsibility on the part
of the State.”145 Yugoslavia’s delegate mentioned an incident in which war criminals
illegally entered Yugoslavia with plans to commit crimes of genocide.146 The French
amendment received only 2 votes in favor, 40 against, and 1 abstention.147
One issue that judges have with resort to the legislative history of statutes or treaties
is that the process can be somewhat selective, with text, history, and case law providing
ample opportunity to reach nearly any conclusion.148 In this vein, advocates of the most
restrictive construction of the UNCG have no trouble disregarding the drafting history
of the UNCG when the history indicates a broad meaning. Thus, for example, while
acknowledging that the drafting history of the UNCG reﬂects a clear rejection of a
requirement of a genocidal plan or policy, Schabas has argued that it is impossible to
imagine genocide without it. He persisted in this view even after several judges of inter-
national criminal tribunals disagreed with him.149 Finally, when some other judges
(notably within the ICTY) and the Darfur commission agreed with him, he looked to
their rulings as authoritative, despite criticizing rulings by judges over the years as con-
tradicting the drafting history.150 When both judges and the drafting history repudiated
his narrow reading of the UNCG, he appealed to public policy.151 The gist of this policy
argument is that a generous interpretation of the UNCG “demeans the suffering of the
victims”; how the survivors of massacres in Rwanda are demeaned by genocide preven-
tion is not explained, and indeed the notion is denied by survivors themselves.152
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Was State Responsibility for Genocide Intended to Be Prospective Only?
Some scholars have argued that the UNCG is inapplicable to the Armenian Genocide,
either because of insufﬁcient deaths or because the only acts that occurred between the
1920s and 1940s, when the customary international law crime of genocide might have
come into existence, involved the destruction of cultural, historical, and religious heri-
tage, to which the UNCG does not apply.153 Schabas, for example, has argued that scho-
lars on the Armenian Genocide “overstate the law” in order to “play well in certain
Armenian communities,” implicitly accusing them of twisting the law to earn funds or
gain popularity in the Armenian Diaspora.154 He insisted repeatedly that Turkey has no
responsibility for the Armenian Genocide, even though Germany and German ofﬁcials
had to take responsibility for a genocide completed before the UNCG was drafted.155
The typical analysis of the retrospective application of the UNCG has several de-
fects. First, it assumes that statutes of limitation on genocide may only be relaxed in the
case of an ongoing genocide.156 Second, it assumes that Germany’s payment of repara-
tions to the State of Israel and individual Jews was strictly voluntary.157 Third, it as-
sumes that international law will not make any progress in the next century toward
redressing instances of mass violence that occurred in the distant past.158
Case law arising out of the US casts doubt on these assumptions. First, at least one
court has held that statutes of limitation should not apply to crimes against humanity
concluded decades ago, such as during the Vietnam War.159 The court noted that the
“principle of non-applicability of statutory limitations” to crimes against humanity, in-
cluding genocide, is recognized in international treaties including the Rome Statute of
the ICC and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.160 The latter convention reﬂects customary
international law enforceable in the US, according to some scholars.161 Second, US
courts have conﬁrmed that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ threats of litigation compelled Germany
to come to the table with various other entities and announce a scheme to compensate
survivors of the Nazi era for the actions of Germany’s war industry.162 Prior to that, the
victims of Nazis received compensation,163 including by such means as the seizure of
assets by the Allies and their distribution to Jews and other survivors of Nazi crimes.164
Even before the UNCG was drafted, the occupying powers in Germany established
General Claims Laws to distribute gold, diamonds, and ﬁne art to Jews and other vic-
tims.165 Third, in 2006, the State of California extended the statute of limitations for
Armenian Genocide survivors until 2010 to 2016.166 The law marches on.
Do Genocide Scholars Have a Responsibility to Past and Future
Victims of Genocide?
Roger Smith, Erik Markusen, and Robert Jay Lifton have argued that genocide scholars
have a professional responsibility not to give too much analytical aid to the defenders of
genocidal acts.167 With Charny, they maintained that genocide denial may be an assault
on the cultural identity and national existence of the victim group.168 The destruction
of the remembrance of the act increases the likelihood of a recurrence.169 Denial leads
to a “situation of impunity,” which “fosters the chronic repetition of human rights vio-
lations and the total defenselessness of the victims and their next of kin.”170 As others
have argued with respect to torture, lawyers might embolden perpetrators.171
The “deﬁnitionalist” position that partial, cultural, ethnic, or religious genocide is
not a violation of the UNCG, and that the UNCG should not be modiﬁed upon its
enactment in domestic penal codes to include such non-racial groups, threatens to
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exonerate those accused of past genocide and to embolden the perpetrators of future
genocides. The position is a popular one in Turkey, Russia, China, Sudan, Yugoslavia,
and other places where past or present leaders have been charged with genocide by
human rights advocates.172 As a Turkish diplomat summarized the deﬁnitionalist per-
spective in the Turkish Daily News, murders or rapes targeting a group such as the Ar-
menians are genocidal only if “committed on a collective scale with a racist motive
leading to the formation of the intent to destroy the group ‘as such’” or if committed
“with the intent to destroy, which is motivated by racial hatred.”173 The author argued
that the Armenians were solely a “political group” despite their ethnic and religious dif-
ferences, and “no anti-Armenian racism existed.”174 On a related note, Schabas cited a
rumor that a Russian ofﬁcial agreed with him that genocide could not have been com-
mitted in Darfur for then it might have been committed in Chechnya as well.175 Fur-
thermore, China resisted the Security Council’s application of the word “genocide” to
the atrocities perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994; at least one expert cites “the Tibet factor”
because China might have had “Taiwan or Tibet in mind.”176 The Sudanese govern-
ment smugly embraced the ICID report’s adoption of the theory of genocide as total
destruction in January 2005.177 Tellingly, British attorneys hired by two organizations
supporting the Sudanese government and working in coordination with Sudanese ofﬁ-
cials urged the ICC to read Schabas’s works and ﬁnd that “grave crimes have been com-
mitted in Darfur by all parties to the conﬂict” but not genocide.178 Finally, it is worth
noting that several defendants accused of genocide in Yugoslavia offered Schabas’s
expert report that did not ﬁnd genocide to have been committed, a report which the
tribunal found to be an improper attempt to usurp the law-ﬁnding function of the tri-
bunal’s own judges.179 Radovan Karadžić expressed hope in his pre-trial brief that Scha-
bas’s work would exonerate him on the grounds of lack of intent.180
Part of the problem is that arguments against applying the concept of genocide to
partial genocides usually rest on the denial of the magnitude of the events themselves.
Thus, writers in the total genocide tradition of scholarship have ignored the true scale
of death during episodes of mass violence. Regarding the Armenian Genocide, Schabas
basically denied it on grounds of inadequate destruction in the period since genocide
entered customary international law, which was sometime between 1914 and 1939.181
He argued that only property was subject to ongoing destruction even though in reality
countless thousands of Armenians must have died prematurely and/or suffered serious
mental harm as a result of poverty or ill-health since the 1920s, and he dismissed claims
that the continuous destruction of Armenian monuments reﬂects an ongoing intention
to destroy Armenia.182 In his view, the only recognition appropriate for the Armenian
Genocide, like the Cambodian one, would be a political, not a legal, one.183
Schabas also characterized the Cambodian Genocide as not meeting a rigorous
deﬁnition of genocide because “destruction of religious institutions and forced assimi-
lation of populations are acts of cultural, not physical, genocide.”184 Yet he failed to offer
a death toll of Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge or to apply Article II(c) of the
UNCG, which refers to “deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”185 Nor did he discuss Arti-
cles II(d) or II(e) in this context, which refer to “imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group” and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.”186 The Khmer Rouge forcibly sterilized women and stole children from their
parents in order to destroy families and work children to death.187 Ben Kiernan and
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others have shown that the Buddhist, Vietnamese, and Muslim populations of Cambo-
dia were not simply assimilated; they were massacred and tortured.188 The post-Khmer
Rouge government announced that 1,800 Buddhist monks and 41,000 Muslims were
killed or died from Khmer Rouge policies in Phnom Penh from 1975 to 1979.189 None
of Schabas’s works provided any evidence that the death toll among Tutsi in Kigali was
higher than that, even though he refers to Tutsi as victims of a clear genocide.190
There are similar ﬂaws with scholarly analyses of genocide charges relating to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Darfur. Writing on Bosnia/Herzegovina and Kosovo,
some scholars fail to acknowledge that scientiﬁc studies suggest that estimates of excess
deaths vary between 200,000 and 305,000 for Bosnia/Herzegovina and between 12,000
and 18,300 for Kosovo.191 Scholars have argued, moreover, that only “men of military
age” were killed at Srebrenica,192 whereas evidence showed that younger boys were also
killed.193 With respect to Darfur, scholars have often failed to acknowledge a death toll
of 70,000 in 2004, rising to 400,000 in 2006,194 or have described the events as mas-
sacres of the “military-aged men” and displacement of the civilian population,195 when
in fact many children, women, and elderly people have been massacred as well, even ac-
cording to the deeply ﬂawed ICID report.196 These omissions of death tolls widely cited
by others are central to some total-genocide scholars’ argument that deportation is a
humane, protective policy.197
Restoring the Legal Force of the UNCG
Advocates of a pro-defendant construction of the UNCG argue that it will not result in
an “impunity gap” for perpetrators of genocide by selective massacres or the imposition
of poor living conditions.198 The theory is that crimes against humanity will cover these
acts.
However, there is no counterpart to Article I of the UNCG which establishes an
obligation to prevent and punish all crimes against humanity.199 Crimes against
humanity have been committed in nearly every conﬂict since World War II, and inter-
national criminal tribunals have not been forthcoming in punishing the perpetrators,
especially in the Baltic states, the Koreas, Tibet, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Afghanistan,
Chechnya, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, British
Kenya, Burundi, the Congo, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa,
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Even when a hybrid tribunal has convened, as with the
Special Panels and Serious Crimes Unit for East Timor, the result has often made a
mockery of justice.200
Some scholars have suggested that no one cares and have implied that nothing
should be done when a single individual kills or maims many others with the intent to
destroy an entire group.201 It would “trivialize” the UNCG to punish an ethnic or reli-
gious massacre by such a person, is the suggestion.202 When the US was convinced that
the events in Rwanda were simply local “acts of genocide” without a total physical geno-
cide, the State Department took the view that the US would not be obligated to punish
the perpetrators or prevent the acts.203
The narrow deﬁnition of genocide popularized by scholars and adopted by the ICJ
deprives the UNCG of most of its legal force because few or none of the mass atrocities
since 1948 qualify as genocide.204 With the ICTR’s judgment in the Bagosora case, even
Rwanda could be doubted to be a total racial genocide.205 In the case of Darfur, Profes-
sor Gérard Prunier observed that the public’s “mass-consumption need for brands and
labels” means that “a genocide is more serious[,] a great tragedy and more deserving of
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our attention than [the deaths] of 250,000 people in non-genocidal massacres.”206
Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Sudan probably had to be “branded” as anti-minority
genocides before anything could be done; indeed, massive crimes against humanity
against the dominant ethnic groups in these countries went unpunished by the UN sys-
tem.207 The insistence on the original understanding of the UNCG contributed to action
on Darfur.
In adopting the total genocide model of the UNCG, the ICJ, ICC Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I, and ICID report created an “almost impossible standard of proof ” for establishing
genocidal speciﬁc intent.208 As Eric Reeves has argued, it seems that they were attempt-
ing to ensure “the irrelevance of the Genocide Convention.”209 Only the rejection of
this model and a return to ﬁrst principles can ensure the UNCG’s effectiveness.
Likewise, adding a “plan or policy” of genocide as an element of the crime results
in nearly impassable barriers to the enforcement of the UNCG. The actual killers during
genocides would usually be acquitted on the basis that they were not aware of the total
extermination scheme decided by the political or military leadership.210 The leaders
would often then be acquitted for not committing the genocidal acts themselves.211 It is
a perfect recipe for impunity.
The drafters of the UNCG predicted that impunity would result if the deﬁnition of
genocide were to be made very narrow. During the debate on the French amendment
requiring the participation of rulers in genocide, the Venezuelan delegate argued that
“fear of punishment would be diminished in the case of non-rulers, while rulers them-
selves would frequently be able to escape punishment, either by avoiding trial by all pos-
sible methods or by shaking off responsibility by making false accusations.”212 The
Soviet Union remarked that a deﬁnition based on a state policy would “free the large
majority of those who had committed acts of genocide from all responsibility and . . .
give rulers an opportunity to avoid punishment by alleging that the crimes of which
they had been accused had been committed in circumstances beyond their control.”213
This is, of course, occurring now with respect to Cambodia, Darfur, Iraq, Rwanda, and
Yugoslavia.
Conclusion
Genocide research is at an ethical and legal turning point. The question it faces is, Will
excessively pro-defendant interpretations of the UNCG make it inapplicable to the
mass murders of the twenty-ﬁrst century? And, in so doing, will scholars belittle the
full scale of post-World War II genocides in order to classify them as war crimes or
“tragedies”?
The drafters of the UNCG have left us a precious legacy. After centuries of crimes
by heads of state, the efforts of Lemkin and others created a framework to prevent and
punish such atrocities. The UNCG they handed down to us is a ﬂexible and forward-
looking instrument, stripped of the limiting references to Nazism and fascism that the
Soviet Union would have liked to use to bind judges and prosecutors to the past.
The UNCG is a promise to all the peoples of the world that by common resolve
humanity will halt not only racial annihilation by poison gas or mass grave but also
other methods of targeting human groups for total or partial destruction. Genocide
scholars have the solemn responsibility of transmitting the hope and determination
conveyed by this promise to future generations. They must not forget that the UNCG
was drafted to predict and pre-empt new forms of genocide.
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